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An Examination Of The
California Fireman's Rule
The 1968 decision in Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.1 brought
California into agreement with an overwhelming majority of jurisdic-
tions2 which maintain that a paid fireman has no cause of action against
one whose negligence8 caused the fire in which he was injured. While
the historical roots of this "fireman's rule" have been heavily entwined
in the theories of land-occupier immunity and assumption of risk,4 the
rationale utilized by the California court was that of public policy5 If
the California rule is to be based on public policy considerations and
not merely on stare decisis, this rationale merits closer scrutiny. This
comment examines the modem justifications for the fireman's rule and
considers its continued viability in California in light of countervailing
considerations of public policy. Since firemen are barred by the rule
from recovering for injuries sustained as a result of their employment
while other similarly situated public employees are not, this comment
also examines an equal protection challenge to the validity of the fire-
man's rule in California.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE
The courts originally approached the issue of liability to firemen as
they did the liability of land-occupiers in general, 6 that is, by classifying
those entering onto premises as either trespassers, licensees, or invitees
and graduating accordingly the duties owed. Since firemen entered
1. 266 Cal. App. 2d 355, 72 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1968).
2. E.g., Romedy v. Johnston, 193 So. 2d 487 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Netherton v.
Arends, 81 Ill. App. 2d 391, 225 N.E.2d 143 (1967); Buren v. Midwest Indus., Inc.,
380 S.W.2d 96 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964); Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 206 A.2d
148 (1965); Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co., 232 Minn. 394, 45 N.W.2d 549
(1951); Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129 (1960); Jackson v. Velveray Corp.,
82 N.J. Super. 469, 198 A.2d 115 (App. Div. 1964); McGee v. Adams Paper & Twine
Co., 26 App. Div. 2d 186, 271 N.Y.S.2d 698 (1966).
3. 266 Cal. App. 2d at 360, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 123. "We do not deal with the ar-
sonist or with one who prankishly or maliciously turns in a false alarm." Id.
4. See text accompanying notes 6-30 infra.
5. 266 Cal. App. 2d at 359, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
6. See, e.g., Roberts v. Rosenblatt, 146 Conn. 110, 148 A.2d 142 (1959); Baxley
v. Williams Constr. Co., 98 Ga. App. 662, 106 S.E.2d 799 (1958); Wax v. Co-operative
Refinery Ass'n, 154 Neb. 805, 49 N.W.2d 707 (1951).
7. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §27.1, at 1430-32 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as HAPER & JAMEs]; RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §§328E-350
(1965).
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under a right conferred by virtue of their duty to the public, they did
not easily fit into this rigid8 and arbitrary9 classification system and thus
presented the courts with a dilemma in the establishment of the correct
level of duty owed to them.10 The first case to address this issue held
that a fireman entering onto private premises in the performance of
his public duty was a mere licensee to whom no duty was owed other
than that of refraining from the willful or wanton infliction of injuries."
The wisdom of this decision is questionable not only because it may
have been based upon a misconception as to the sense in which its cited
authority' 2 defined the term licensee, but also because the result is
anomalous. The privilege of firemen to enter onto premises
is independent of any permission, consent or license of the occupier,
and they would be privileged to enter, and would insist upon doing
so, even if he made active objection. They normally do not come
for any of the purposes for which the premises are held open to
the public, and frequently, upon private premises, they do not en-
ter for any benefit of the occupier, or under circumstances which
justify any expectation that the place has been prepared to receive
them.' 3
Despite the lack of an appropriate basis for the classification of firemen
as licensees, this rule [hereinafter referred to as the original fireman's
rule] prevailed, and its application negated occupier liability for the
two broad categories of injuries sustained by firemen: those resulting
from defects in the premises not related to the fire, and those sustained
as a result of the occupier's negligence in creating the condition neces-
8. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 7, §27.14, at 1498.
9. W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THm LAW OF TORTS §61, at 396 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PRossER].
10. It is a curious fact that until the question of the right of policemen, fire-
men and other governmental officials to recover for injuries caused by the de-
fective condition of private premises which their official duties required them
to enter came before the American courts, no case had required any court to
pass on the question of the duty of a landowner toward those who entered his
property in the exercise of some right or privilege thereover, which was itself
in derogation of the otherwise complete right of an owner to exclude from his
land any one he saw fit.
Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner Towards Those Entering His Premises of Their Own
Right, 69 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 342-43 (1921).
11. Gibson v. Leonard, 143 I1. 182, 32 N.E. 182 (1892). The rule announced
in this case was also utilized in denying liability to policemen in analogous situations.
E.g., Louisville & N.R.R. Co. v. Griswold, 241 Ala. 104, 1 So. 2d 393 (1941) Schuerer
v. Trustees of Open Bible Church, 175 Ohio St. 163, 192 N.E.2d 38 (1963); Kithcart
v. Feldman, 89 Okla. 276, 215 P. 419 (1923); Cook v. Demetrakas, 275 A.2d 919 (R.I.
1971).
12. T. CooLEY, TORTS 313 (1st ed. 1880), cited in Gibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182,
183, 32 N.E. 182, 183 (1892). See Comment, Are Firemen and Policemen Licensees
or Invitees?, 35 MICIH. L. REv. 1157, 1159 (1937).
13. PRossER, supra note 9, §61, at 396 (emphasis added); see Bohlen, The Duty
of a Landowner Towards Those Entering His Premises of Their Own Right, 69 U .PA.
L. Rav. 340, 344 (1921).
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sitating the fireman's presence. 4
The steadfast refusal by the courts to accord firemen invitee status
was apparently motivated by a concern that the imposition of a duty
to make the premises reasonably safe for one whose visits were unpre-
dictable and infrequent would place too severe a burden on the occu-
pier.15 This judicial concern, however, was unwarranted since applica-
tion of the foreseeability-of-harm element of actionable negligence
would require the occupier to take only reasonable precautions against
foreseeably unreasonable danger. 16  Dangers would not have to be re-
moved from places where they would not likely be encountered, and
pitfalls would not be unreasonable in places where entrants could be
expected to find and avoid them.' 7  The courts grew increasingly cog-
nzant of this misplaced concern for the occupier's burden since the
original fireman's rule often led to harsh results for firemen.' 8 Even-
tually the rule became laced with exceptions that tended to bring it
in line with general principles of negligence,' 9 and accordingly occu-
piers were held liable to firemen for active negligence,20 breach of a
statutory duty,2' failure to warn of hidden dangers, 22 and for negligent
maintenance of an approach prepared for those entitled to enter.23,
14. See Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner Towards Those Entering His Premises
of Their Own Right, 69 U. PA. L. REv. 237, 237 (1921).
15. See, e.g., Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co., 232 Minn. 394, 397, 45
N.W.2d 549, 551 (1951); Boneau v. Swift & Co., 66 S.W.2d 172, 173 (Mo. App. 1934);
26 COLUm. L. REv. 116 (1926); 22 MnN. L. REv. 898 (1938). For a discussion of
Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co. see 35 MINN. L. REv. 512 (1951); 12 U. Prrr
L. REv. 646 (1951).
16. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 7, §27.14, at 1501-02. See PRossnRi, supra note
9, §61, at 397-98.
17. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 7, §27.14, at 1502. See Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.
2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Cameron v. Abatiell, 127 Vt. 111, 241 A.2d 310
(1968).
18. E.g., Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 414, 170 N.E.2d 881, 884 (1960); Mul-
crone v. Wagner, 212 Minn. 478, 482, 4 N.W.2d 97, 99 (1942); Hamilton v. Minne-
apolis Desk Mfg. Co., 78 Minn. 3, 5, 80 N.W. 693, 694 (1899).
19. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 7, §27.14, at 1505.
20. E.g., Buren v. Midwest Industries, Inc., 380 S.W.2d 96 (Ky. 1964); Anderson
v. Cinnamon, 365 Mo. 304, 282 S.W.2d 445 (1955).
21. E.g., Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Arvanis v. Ei-
senberg, 237 Md. 242, 206 A.2d 148 (1965); McGee v. Adams Paper & Twine Co., 26
App. Div. 2d 186, 271 N.Y.S.2d 698 (1966). Contra, e.g., Aldworth v. F.W. Woolworth
Co., 295 Mass. 344, 3 N.E.2d 1008 (1936); Wax v. Co-operative Refinery Ass'n, 154
Neb. 805, 49 N.W.2d 707 (1951).
22. E.g., Netherton v. Arends, 81 Ill. App. 2d 391, 225 N.E.2d 143 (1967); Am-
vanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 206 A.2d 148 (1965); Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper
Products Co., 232 Minn. 394, 45 N.W.2d 549 (1951); Beedenbender v. Midtown Prop-
erties, Inc., 4 App. Div. 2d 276, 164 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1957).
23. E.g., Meiers v. Fred Kock Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920); Bee-
denbender v. Midtown Properties, Inc., 4 App. Div. 2d 276, 164 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1957).
See Comment, Liability of Property Owners Towards Policemen and Firemen, 25 AL-
SANY L. REV. 105 (1961); Note, Landowner's Negligence Liability to Persons Entering
as a Matter of Right or Under a Privilege of Private Necessity, 19 VAND. L. REv. 407,
409-17 (1966); 28 CORNELL L.Q. 232 (1943); 34 HARV. L. R.V. 87 (1920); 30 YALE
L.J. 93 (1920-21).
1975 / California Fireman's Rule
Several jurisdictions rejected the label of licensee and declared firemen
to be sui generis,2 4 though with little change in the duty owed to them,25
and a few jurisdictions classified firemen as invitees, thereby imposing
the common law duty of reasonable care.2
Although the courts allowed some expansion of liability under the
fireman's rule, they displayed a marked reluctance to impose liability
upon anyone, whether occupier or nonoccupier, whose only negligence
was to cause the fire which necessitated the fireman's presence and
proximately caused his injury. 1  This reluctance resulted in the crea-
tion of a second fireman's rule which denied a fireman a cause of ac-
tion against one whose negligence caused the fire in which he was in-
jured. The rationale for this rule has been expressed either in terms
of a distinct limitation on the duty owed firemen based on public
policy,2s or in terms of a defense based on assumption of risk.29 This
rule has won almost universal acceptance3" and is the most formidable
barrier to a fireman's recovery.
24. E.g., Buren v. Midwest Industries, Inc., 380 S.W.2d 96 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964);
Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co., 232 Minn. 394, 45 N.W.2d 549 (1951);
Krauth v. Geller, 31 NJ. 270, 157 A.2d 129 (1960).
25. Mhe owner is obliged to use reasonable care to keep in safe condition
those parts of the premises which are utilized as the ordinary means of access
for all persons entering thereon ... [and] if the owner knows of the presence
on the premises of officially privileged persons, such as firemen or policemen,
is cognizant of a dangerous condition thereon, and has reason to believe that
they are unaware of the danger, he has a duty to warn them of the condition
and of the risk involved.
Beedenbender v. Midtown Properties, Inc., 4 App. Div. 2d 276, 281, 164 N.Y.S.2d 276,
281 (1957) (citations omitted). This is the same level of duty adopted by the Restate-
ment of Torts for licensees. RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTs §§342-345 (1965).
26. Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Horcher v. Guerin,
94 Ill. App. 2d 244, 236 N.E.2d 576 (1968); Netherton v. Arends, 81 InI. App. 2d 391,
225 N.E.2d 143 (1967); Strong v. Seattle Stevedore Co., 1 Wash. App. 898, 466 P.2d
545 (1970). See Cameron v. Abatiell, 127 Vt. 111, 241 A.2d 310 (1968). For a dis-
cussion of the Dini v. Naiditch decision see 38 Cmi.-KENT L. Rv. 75 (1961); 47 COR-
NELL L.Q. 119 (1961); 14 VAND. L. REV. 1541 (1961).
27. Note, Landowner's Negligence Liability to Persons Entering as a Matter of
Right or Under a Privilege of Private Necessity, 19 VAND. L Rrv. 407, 419 (1966).
The general rule as to the nonliability of an owner or occupant to a paid
fireman for negligence is often stated in terms of nonliability for negligence
in creating or starting a fire. However, it seems clear that on principle such
rule. . . extends not only to negligence in creating or starting the fire but also
includes negligence related to the spread of the fire, such as ordinary negli-
gence in housekeeping which tends to promote the spread of a fire after its
inception from other causes. Indeed, the two situations are often indistinguish-
able.
Jackson v. Velveray Corp., 82 NJ. Super. 469, 475, 198 A.2d 115, 118 (App. Div. 1964)
(citations omitted and emphasis added).
28. E.g., Romedy v. Johnston, 193 So. 2d 487 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Buren v. Mid-
west Industries, Inc., 380 S.W.2d 96 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964); Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J.
270, 157 A.2d 129 (1960).
29. E.g., Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co., 232 Minn. 394, 45 N.W.2d 549
(1951); Walsh v. Madison Park Properties, Ltd., 102 N.J. Super. 134, 245 A.2d 512
(1968); Spencer v. B.P. John Furniture Corp., 255 Ore. 359, 467 P.2d 429 (1969);
Chesapeake & O.R.R. v. Crouch, 208 Va. 602, 159 S.E.2d 650 (1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 845 (1969); Hass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 48 Wis. 2d 321, 179 N.W.2d 885 (1970).
30. See cases cited note 2, supra.
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THE CALiFORNIA FIREMAN'S RULE
California never formally adopted the original fireman's rule,81 and
any chance of its doing so was foreclosed by the California Supreme
Court's 1968 decision in Rowland v. Christian.32 Rowland abolished
the inflexible trespasser-licensee-invitee classification system for land-
occupier liability, upon which the original fireman's rule was based, in
favor of an approach which emphasizes foreseeability of injury to
others.8 3 The Rowland court held that section 1714 of the California
Civil Code constitutes the sole basis for a negligence action, 4 and that
"[t]he proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land
. . . is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a
reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others. .... 3
Under a strict application of this test, an occupier would apparently be
liable to a fireman injured by a defect in the premises unrelated to the
fire in those situations in which there existed a foreseeable risk of in-
jury. Further, since it is foreseeable that a negligently caused fire
could result in injuries to a fireman, a duty to use care to prevent such
an occurrence would seem to exist.3 6 The Rowland court, however,
recognized that an exception to the existence of a duty might arise:
"ilt is clear that in the absence of statutory provision declaring an
exception to the fundamental principle enunciated by section 1714 of
the Civil Code, no such exception should be made unless clearly sup-
ported by public policy. '" 7 The court proceeded to outline broad cri-
31. Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 355, 357, 72 Cal. Rptr.
119, 121 (1968). Two California cases are sometimes erroneously cited as authority
for the original fireman's rule, to wit, Pennebaker v. San Joaquin Light & Power Co.,
158 Cal. 579, 112 P. 459 (1910) (antecedent negligence towards a fireman), cited in
Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 1205, 1209 (1962), and Wilson v. Union Iron Works Dry Dock
Co., 167 Cal. 539, 140 P. 250 (1914) (customs collector), cited in 4 B. ViTnN, SUM-
MARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §582, at 2850 (8th ed. 1974).
32. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
33. Id. at 112-19, 443 P.2d at 564-68, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100-04. See also Fitch v.
LeBeau, 1 Cal. App. 3d 320, 81 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1969).
34. Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but
also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill
in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has,
willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself ....
CAL. CIV. CODE §1714.
35. 69 Cal. 2d at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
36. "That the misfortune here experienced by a fireman was well within the range
of foreseeability cannot be disputed." Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 273, 157 A.2d 129,
130 (1960). See National Sur. Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 149 So. 2d 438, (La. Ct.
App. 1963); Utah Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Leonard, 100 So. 2d 259 (La. Ct. App. 1958);
Benton v. Montague, 253 N.C. 695, 117 S.E.2d 771 (1961); Schafer v. Wells, 171 Ohio
St. 506, 172 N.E.2d 708 (1961). See generally Connor v. Great Western Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.
2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320
P.2d 16 (1958); Raymond v. Paradise Unified School Dist., 218 Cal. App. 2d 1, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 847 (1963).
37. 69 Cal. 2d at 112, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100 (citations omitted
and emphasis added).
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teria that would determine whether an exception should apply:
A departure from this fundamental principle involves the balancing
of a number of considerations; the major ones are the foreseeability
of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection -between the de-
fendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame at-
tached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future
harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences
to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with result-
ing liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence
of insurance for the risk involved.38
Although the fireman's rule creates an exception to the general liability
principle reaffirmed in Rowland, its adoption in Giorgi v. Pacific Gas
& Electric Co.39 was not predicated upon an analysis of the criteria
that Rowland set forth for determining whether such an exception
should be made.
In Giorgi, the jury determined that defendant Pacific Gas and Elec-
tric Company's negligent maintenance of a pole and wires caused a
forest fire and found defendant liable for the deaths and injuries sus-
tained when a sudden turn of the fire trapped six federal employees,
all of whom were trained and required to fight forest fires as part of
their duties.40  The court of appeal reversed this decision after ex-
pressly adopting the second fireman's rule. The court held that "a paid
fireman has no cause of action against one whose passive negligence
caused the fire in which he was injured."'" This rule was subsequently
expanded in the case of Scott v. E.L. Yeager Construction Co.,
4 2
wherein another court of appeal, in a situation factually analogous to
Giorgi,43 discarded Giorgi's active-passive negligence dichotomy after
noting that it originated in the abrogated licensee distinction which was
no longer manageable or beneficial as a tool of tort analysis."
When the Giorgi court adopted the second fireman's rule, the tra-
ditional scheme of determining occupier liability based upon classifica-
tion of the entrant was no longer extant; moreover, it would not have
been applicable since the fire did not occur on the defendant's prop-
38. Id. at 112-13, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100 (citations omitted).
39. 266 Cal. App. 2d 355, 72 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1968).
40. Id. at 356-57, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
41. Id. at 360, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 123 (emphasis added).
42. 12 Cal. App. 3d 1190, 91 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1970).
43. In Scott, plaintiff fireman was severely burned when an explosion occurred as
repairs were being completed on a gas line ruptured by the negligent act of the defendant
construction company. Id. at 1192-94, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 233-34.
44. Id. at 1196, 91 Cal. Rptr. 236.
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erty.415 Equally unavailable as a rationale for the fireman's rule was
the defense of assumption of risk, since in California one under a duty
to act cannot and does not assume the risk.46  The Giorgi court thus
turned to public policy considerations in justifying its adoption of the
fireman's rule in California.47 If the California rule is to be based on
public policy considerations and not merely a false allegiance to land-
occupier immunities,48 the policy arguments merit closer scrutiny in
light of the criteria established by the Rowland court for determining
whether an exception to the existence of a duty exists.49
THE RATIONALE FOR THE CALIFORNIA FIREMAN'S RULE
In denying recovery to the plaintiff firemen, both the Giorgi and
Scott courts relied heavily on Krauth v. Geller,5" a 1960 decision of
the New Jersey Supreme Court, which Giorgi characterized "as being
entirely modem in its approach to tort law."'  The Krauth court ap-
proached the question of whether a fireman could recover from an
owner or occupier of land for negligence in the creation of a fire by
positing that "[tlhe question is ultimately one of public policy, and the
answer must be distilled from the relevant factors involved upon an in-
quiry into what is fair and just."" Having predicated its analysis on
public policy considerations, the court proceeded to adopt the fireman's
rule by holding that "[i]n terms of duty, it may be said there is none
owed the fireman to exercise care so as not to require the special ser-
vices for which he is trained and paid." 3 The court underscored the
primary element of its public policy rationale by stating:
[I]n the final analysis the policy decision is that it would be too
burdensome to charge all who carelessly cause or fail to prevent
fires with the injuries suffered by the expert retained with public
funds to deal with those inevitable, although negligently created,
45. 266 Cal. App. 2d at 357, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 120-21. See text accompanying
notes 32-33 supra.
46. Vierra v. Fifth Ave. Rental Serv., 60 Cal. 2d 266, 383 P.2d 777, 32 Cal. Rptr.
193 (1963); Rogers v. Los Angeles Transit Line, 45 Cal. 2d 414, 289 P.2d 226 (1955);
Bilyeu v. Standard Freight Lines, 182 Cal. App. 2d 536, 6 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1960). Cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs §496E, comment c (1965). See also Solgaard v.
Atkinson Co., 6 Cal. 3d 361, 491 P.2d 821, 99 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1971).
47. 266 Cal. App. 2d at 359, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 122, quoting Krauth v. Geller, 31
N.J. 270, 273, 157 A.2d 129, 130 (1960).
48. "There is little doubt that the rule originated in the land occupier cases." Scott
v. E.L. Yeager Constr. Co., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1190, 1194-95, 91 Cal. Rptr. 232, 235
(1970) (citations omitted).
49. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
50. 31 NJ. 270, 157 A.2d 129 (1960).
51. Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 355, 359, 72 Cal. Rptr.
119, 122 (1968).
52. 31 NJ. at 273, 157 A.2d at 130 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 274, 157 A.2d at 131.
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occurrences. Hence, for that risk the fireman should receive ap-
propriate compensation from the public he serves, both in pay
which reflects the hazard and in workmen's compensation benefits
for the consequences of the inherent risks of the calling.54
The Giorgi and Scott courts, in adopting the California fireman's
rule, followed Krauth's example and predicated their holdings upon
analyses of public policy considerations. The Scott court, however, in
its "resolution of the significant policy considerations underlying the
'fireman's rule,' "" seized upon Krauth's premise that the fireman's rule
evolves from "an inquiry into what is fair and just"56 as a separate "fair-
ness" basis for the rule, independent of the public policy basis.5 7 It ap-
pears that Scott's reliance on Krauth for this differentiation in bases for
the fireman's rule is misplaced since the Krauth court framed its adop-
tion of the rule solely in terms of public policy and treated the "fair-
ness" consideration merely as an element of this analysis. Thus, the fair-
ness consideration can more appropriately be characterized as an ele-
ment of the public policy rationale for the fireman's rule rather than
a basis in and of itself. In the final analysis, Krauth's fairness considera-
tion, which was seemingly elevated to artificial import by Scott, is sim-
ply a restatement, or conclusion, of the public policy considerations
which underlie the fireman's rule as it has evolved in California and
New Jersey.
As partial justification for its adoption of the fireman's rule, the
Giorgi court incorporated the "too burdensome" language of Krauth58
into a public policy argument relating to distribution of the cost of com-
pensating for firemen's injuries.59 The gist of this argument is that in-
juries to firefighters are both inevitable and prevalent and should be
borne by the public as an incident of community living. The Giorgi
court recognized this position as being consistent with the modern tort
law policy of "spreading the risk"; the defendant taxpayer has paid a
pro rata share for fire protection, and any injuries incurred in fighting
negligently created fires should be considered a part of the cost of fire
protection and paid'out of the public fund.60
Having utilized the Krauth opinion in the formulation of a public
policy consideration relating to distribution of cost, the Giorgi court
54. Id. (citations omitted and emphasis added).
55. 12 Cal. App. 3d at 1194, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
56. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
57. 12 Cal. App. 3d at 1195, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
58. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
59. 266 Cal. App. 2d at 360, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
60. Id. See HmtPER & JAMEs, supra note 7, §27.14, at 1503-04.
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promulgated another policy consideration pertaining to the efficient ad-
ministration of justice:
The great majority of fires doubtless are caused by or contributed
to by passive human negligence. Most fires of any consequence
result in injury, happily many of them rather minor, to some fire-
men. Judicial determination of the cause of a fire, after its destruc-
tion has been wrought, presents difficult problems requiring lengthy
trials. 61
The court expressed further concern for the efficient administration of
justice by asking:
What of obvious expansions of such a rule of liability if adopted?
Would an ambulance driver, responding to a call to pick up victims
of an automobile collision caused by negligence, be allowed re-
covery from the negligent driver in that first collision for injuries
sustained by the speeding ambulance driver in an accident enroute
to the scene? What of an attendant or nurse in the contagious dis-
ease ward of a public hospital? Would he be permitted recovery
for an illness contracted from a patient confined in that ward be-
cause of disease contracted through the patient's negligent exposure
of himself to the infection which caused his own confinement? 2
The two public policy considerations of distribution of cost and effi-
cient administration of justice delineated in Giorgi are outwardly com-
pelling, but a more thorough analysis discloses countervailing considera-
tions that call into question the continued viability of the California
fireman's rule.
TECONTINUED VIABILITY OF THE CALIFORNIA
FIREMAN's RULE
A. The Public Policy Challenge
As previously indicated, 6 the California Supreme Court in Rowland
v. Christian reaffirmed the "general principle that a person is liable for
injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the circum-
stances .... -64 In stating this principle, however, the court acknowl-
edged that an exception could be made if it were "clearly supported
by public policy," which is to be discerned by a balancing of several
considerations enumerated by the court.65 Since the fireman's rule
creates an exception to the general principle that an individual must
exercise reasonable care under the circumstances, Rowland requires
61. 266 Cal. App. 2d at 360, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
62. Id. at 360, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 122-23.
63. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
64. 69 Cal. 2d at 112, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
65. See text accompanying notes 37-38 supra.
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that the rule's validity be examined in light of criteria66 it promulgated
for determining whether a departure from the general principle is justi-
fied.
The first two considerations set forth in Rowland, which seem closely
related in the present context, are "the foreseeability of harm to the
plaintiff [and] the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered in-
jury .... ,,67 Both of these factors seem to suggest a public policy
stance contrary to that embodied in the fireman's rule, since it seems
sufficiently foreseeable that negligent maintenance of one's property
may lead to a fire which will injure those called upon to control it.
68
This is illustrated by the fact that there is no limitation on a defendant's
liability to nonfiremen for injuries suffered as a result of a negligently
started fire. Thus one injured while attempting to protect his own
property from the consequences of the defendant's negligence,69 or
while acting as a mere volunteer,70 may recover. Furthermore, if lack
of foreseeability of injury to firemen was a legitimate factor supporting
the fireman's rule, it would seem logical that a fireman would be
denied a cause of action for any negligently inflicted injury suffered
in the performance of his duties.71  This is not the case, since an in-
jured fireman may recover against a third party for an injury caused
by a defective product used in the course of firefighting 72 or for an
injury not directly related to a fire.73 The Giorgi court itself lent sup-
port to the argument that foreseeability is not a limitation to a fireman's
recovery in stating that "[m]ost fires of any consequence result in
injury. . . to some firemen. 174 This language also bears directly upon
the second Rowland consideration, certainty of injury,"5 which likewise
66. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
67. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
68. See note 36 supra.
69. E.g., Haverstick v. Southern Pac. Co., 1 Cal. App. 2d 605, 37 P.2d 146 (1934);
Esposito v. Christopher, 166 Colo. 361, 443 P.2d 731 (1968); Illinois Cent. R.R. v.
Siler, 229 Ill. 390, 82 N.E. 362 (1907); Glanz v. Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co., 119 Iowa
611, 93 N.W. 575 (1903); St. Louis S.R.R.R. v. Ginn, 264 P.2d 351 (Okla. 1953). See
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §445 (1965).
70. E.g., Pike v. Grand Trunk Ry., 39 F. 255 (1st Cir. 1889); Liming v. Illinois
Cent. R.R., 81 Iowa 246, 47 N.W. 66 (1890); Burnett v. Connor, 299 Mass. 604, 13
N.E.2d 417 (1938); Superior Oil Co. v. Richmond, 172 Miss. 407, 159 So. 850 (1935).
71. The same result should obtain if, as the Giorgi court envisioned, the cost of
fire protection is to be borne by the public. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
72. Kreger v. Diener Mfg. Co., 321 Ill. App. 302, 53 N.E.2d 26 (1944) (exploding
fire extinguisher); Dysko v. Mack Int'l Motor Truck Corp., 142 N.Y.S.2d 699 (Sup. Ct.
1955) (defective ladder).
73. E.g., Norwood Transp. Co. v. Crossett, 207 Ala. 222, 92 So. 461 (1922); Mat-
teoni v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 53 Cal. App. 2d 260, 127 P.2d 574 (1942); Howard
v. Clark, 29 Cal. App. 2d 374, 84 P.2d 529 (1938); Bencich v. Market St. Ry., 20 Cal.
App. 2d 518, 67 P.2d 398 (1937); Malone v. Kansas City Rys., 232 S.W. 782 (Mo.
App. 1921); Hartnett v. Standard Furniture Co., 162 Wyo. 655, 299 P. 408 (1931).
74. 266 Cal. App. 2d at 360, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
75. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
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seems to suggest that public policy does not support the exception to
liability created by the fireman's rule. The certainty of injury con-
sideration is bolstered by statistics on firemen's injuries which show that
the job of a fire fighter is one of the nation's most hazardous. The
fireman faces a mortality rate due to work accidents five times that of
the average worker, and an average injury-severity rate four to five
times that for manufacturing.76
An examination of Rowland's third criterion, the "closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suf-
fered. . . ,,,17 also leads to the conclusion that public policy does not
support an exception to the general liability principle in the case of fire-
men. In addition, this third criterion points to the fundamental illogic
underlying the fireman's rule. For the fireman's rule to apply at all,
the defendant's conduct in negligently causing a fire must be directly
connected to the fireman's injury. 8 This brings one to the anomalous
result that the closeness of the connection between the defendant's con-
duct and the injury suffered by the fireman, which under Rowland's
analysis would support the existence of a duty owed to firemen, oper-
ates as a prerequisite to application of the fireman's rule, which evis-
cerates any such duty.
Another consideration suggested by Rowland as pertinent to the
creation of an exception to the general liability principle is "the policy
of preventing future harm. '79  This consideration, like the three al-
ready discussed, indicates that liability ought to be imposed on one
who negligently causes a fire. If an injured fireman has no cause of
action, a negligent party will be held financially responsible for the fire-
man's loss only to the extent that his taxes cover fire services and pub-
lic employee compensation programs. Since property taxes are paid
in relation to the assessed value of one's property and not in relation to
the risk one creates on his property,80 one who negligently maintains
his property likely contributes taxes disproportionate to the potential
burden the property imposes on the public fund. The fireman's rule
thus provides little economic incentive to the owners of "fire traps" to
maintain their premises in a reasonably firesafe condition.81 Fire pre-
76. STANLEY H. RuTrENBERG & ASSOCIATES, INC., EcONOMIC JUSTIcE: THE NEEDS
OF Fmnn FIGHTERS 19-25 (1970). See Hearings on Death and Disability Benefits for
Policemen and Firemen Before the Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., ser. 31 (1972).
77. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
78. Scott v. E.L. Yeager Constr. Co., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1190, 1199, 91 Cal. Rptr.
232, 238 (1970).
79. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
80. See CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §401.
81. See AMERICA BuRNiNG: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMIssIoN ON FIRE
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vention is much less costly than fire suppression," and anything which
adds to the public awareness of this factor may help to reduce the al-
ready serious and steadily worsening fire problem in this country."3
Thus abolition of the fireman's rule would comport with Rowland's
policy of preventing future harm, both by creating an additional mone-
tary incentive to reduce fire hazards and by increasing public awareness
of the worsening fire problem.
Another criterion set forth in Rowland involves "the extent of the
burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of im-
posing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach .
S..,,4 Close examination of this consideration would also indicate
that the fireman's rule is not supported by the public policy exception
outlined in Rowland. The standard of care which would be imposed
if the fireman's rule were abolished would be that of "reasonable care
in the circumstances,""" and Rowland itself found the burden created
by imposition of this standard -to be insufficient to justify an exception
to liability in the case of land occupiers: "The burden . . may often
be great... but it by no means follows that this is true in every case."8
It may also be questioned whether any greater burden would be im-
posed if the fireman's rule were abolished. The fireman's rule shields
a person from liability for his negligence only as it affects a fireman.
As to anyone else who may be injured as a result of the same negligent
conduct, breach of the duty to exercise reasonable care in preventing
fires is sufficient to create liability. 7  Thus, if an individual did not
breach the standard of reasonable care owed to nonfiremen for the
prevention of fires, there would be no liability to a fireman injured
while fighting a fire. Similar reasoning was employed by the courts
in creating an exception to the original fireman's rule whereby an en-
tering fireman was allowed to recover for injuries sustained upon an
approach prepared for anyone entitled to enter.
8 8
A consideration of the consequences to the community 9 of imposing
a negligence standard on individuals who cause fires leading to a fire-
man's injuries also supports a result contrary to that achieved by the
fireman's rule. By requiring a fireman to look solely to the public for
PREVENTION AND CONTROL 5 (1973) [hereinafter cited as AMERICA BURNINO].
82. Id. at 7.
83. Id. at 1-2.
84. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
85. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
86. 69 Cal. 2d at 118, 443 P.2d at 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
87. See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
88. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
89. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
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compensation for injuries, the fireman's rule imposes a burden on the
community solely for the benefit of a negligent party, and is inconsis-
tent with several legislative provisions relating to or affecting firemen.
First, the workers' compensation laws do not preclude an injured fire-
man from pursuing a tort action against one other than his employer9"
since the "system was not designed to extend immunity to strangers."'"
The limited amounts payable under a workers' compensation plan
2
further suggest that an injured fireman should be allowed to recover
from the tortfeasor the amount by which his damages exceed his award
from the public fund.9 3 Secondly, the state is provided a statutory right
of reimbursement from tortfeasors for compensation 4 or retirementP0
benefits paid to injured state employees. To deny the fireman a cause
of action is to deny the state its right of subrogation, thereby imposing
the burden of compensating firemen for their injuries exclusively upon
the public fund. Thirdly, Health and Safety Code Section 13009 ex-
pressly provides for the recovery, in certain instances, of firefighting
expenses from one whose negligence was the proximate cause of the
fire's origin or escape.9 Since firefighting agencies are allowed to re-
cover their costs under this section,9 7 it seems incongruous, in light of
the apparent legislative policy against underwriting tortfeasors with
public funds, that the individual firefighter would be denied recovery.
The final consideration suggested by Rowland for determining
whether an exception to the general liability principle should exist is
the "availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk in-
volved."98 As with the examination of Rowland's other criteria, lia-
90. CAL. LABOR CODE §3852.
91. 2 A. LARSON, LAW OF WORKM nN'S COMPENSATION §71.00 (1975).
92. 3 A. LARSON, LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, Appendix B, Tables 8-11
(1973); CAL. LABOR CODE §§4658-4660. See Southeast Furniture Co. v. Barret, 24
Utah 2d 24, 27, 465 P.2d 346, 348 (1970) wherein the court noted that "workmen's
compensation acts for one injured . . . [are] . . . comparably speaking ... quite nig-
gardly and unrealistic with respect to jury verdicts....
93. See 2 A. LARSON, LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§71.00-71.20 (1975).
94. CAL. LABOR CODE §§3850-3864.
95. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§21450-21455.
96. Any person who negligently, or in violation of the law, sets a fire, allows
a fire to be set, or allows a fire kindled or attended by him to escape onto
any forest, range or non-residential grass-covered land is liable for the expense
of fighting the fire and such expense shall be a charge against that person.
Such charge shall constitute a debt of such person, and is collectible by the
person, or by the federal, state, county, public, or private agency, incurring
such expenses in the same manner as in the case of an obligation under a con-
tract, expressed or implied.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §13009 (emphasis added). In Giorgi, the state was al-
lowed recovery under this provision. 266 Cal. App. 2d 355, 360, 72 Cal. Rptr. 119,
123 (1968).
97. People v. Williams, 222 Cal. App. 2d 152, 34 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1963); County
of Ventura v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 85 Cal. App. 2d 529, 193 P.2d 512 (1948).
98. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
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bility is again indicated. Liability insurance is readily available to and
increasingly utilized by those either occupying or dealing with real and
personal property.9 9 It is common knowledge that fire insurance, in
the form of the standard homeowner's policy, must often be obtained
as a prerequisite to the securing of financing for the purchase of private
housing. Such insurance incorporates an incentive to maintain a rea-
sonable degree of fire safety since the premium charged is determined
by the risk attendant to the property. As in Rowland, "there is no per-
suasive evidence that applying ordinary principles of negligence law to
the . . . [one responsible for the fire] will materially reduce the preva-
lence of insurance due to increased cost or even substantially increase
the cost."' 00
There are other considerations which, although not included in Row-
land's criteria, seem pertinent to a discussion of the public policy basis
for the fireman's rule. The first of these considerations involves the
burden which the fireman's rule presently places on the fireman. As
noted previously, the job of a fireman is extremely hazardous. 1 1 Yet
the fireman is expected to face this hazard with substantially the same
workers' compensation benefits as any other public employee who is
not similarly handicapped in bringing a cause of action.10 The maxi-
99. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, INSURANCE FACTS 1974 13-14, 17 (1974).
The question of sufficient liability insurance to cover the fire situation has
arisen here. What the general custom was, if any, as to the reasonable amount
of liability protection taken out in 1922 is one thing, and what is reasonable
to-day [sic] is quite another thing. Modem appliances of the machine age
have progressed so fast in this country that the idea of protection afforded by
all kinds of insurance has made rapid strides. The man with the modem in-
come nowadays is educated to secure greater liability protection.
In re Lathers' Will, 137 Misc. 226, 234, 243 N.Y.S. 366, 376 (Sur. Ct. 1930). See PRos-
Sea, supra note 9, §§82-83, at 541-56. See also James, Social Insurance and Tort Lia-
bility: The Problem of Alternate Remedies, 27 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 537 (1952).
100. 69 Cal. 2d at 118, 443 P.2d at 567-68, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103-04.
101. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
102. Special benefit provisions for California firemen include the following: (1)
California Labor Code Sections 4850 to 4855 provide that a public safety employee dis-
abled by injury or illness arising out of and in the course of his duties may elect to
take a leave of absence without loss of salary for up to one full year or until such earlier
date as he is retired on permanent disability pension; (2) California Labor Code Section
212 provides that, as to various law enforcement and fire fighting officers, hernia, heart
trouble, and pneumonia are "injuries" under the act and are presumed to arise out of and
in the course of employment; (3) California Government Code Section 32354 provides
a minimum fifty percent disability retirement benefit for firemen to a maximum of $250
per month.
"There is a great disparity among the several States as to the benefits which are pro-
vided to these courageous men and their survivors. Needless to say, in most cases the
death and disability benefits which are provided are extremely inadequate." Hearings
on Death and Disability Benefits for Policemen and Firemen Before the Subcomm. No.
1 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., ser. 31, at 2 (1972)
(emphasis added).
Workers' compensation coverage is provided for volunteer firemen by California La-
bor Code Section 3361. Additionally, individuals impressed into fighting forest or brush
fires under Public Resources Code Sections 4153 or 4436, or who volunteer to fight or
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mum recovery for permanent disability is $119 per week,108 there is
no recovery for pain and suffering, 0 4 and the dependents and/or heirs
of a fireman are limited to recovery of a maximum death benefit of
$45,000.105
A second consideration which is pertinent to an examination of the
public policy basis for California's fireman's rule is that of all public
servants, only firemen are deemed to be solely dependent upon the
public treasury for compensation for injuries arising directly from their
employment. This is aptly illustrated when firemen are compared to
policemen, who rival firemen in terms of the frequency and severity
of occupational injuries.'0  In Bilyeu v. Standard Freight Lines,07 the
defendant truck driver fell asleep, his truck overturned, and a load of
steel rolls was spilled onto the highway. The plaintiff highway patrol-
man, acting under a legal duty to clear the hazard, severely injured
himself in pushing the steel rolls to the side of the roadway and was
allowed recovery against the defendant.10 8  The status of the highway
patrolman is indistinguishable from that of the firemen in Giorgi and
Scott. All of the plaintiffs were injured as a result of "negligence in
the creation of the very occasion for [their] engagement"; 09 all were
employed by public entities for the benefit of the public; all were en-
gaged in employment with a clearly foreseeable risk of injury; and all
were able to look to workers' compensation funds. That the Bilyeu
decision is irreconcilable with the results reached in Giorgi and Scott
suggests a potential problem in supporting, solely on the basis of public
policy, the denial of a cause of action to a fireman.
The final public policy argument offered by the Giorgi court in sup-
port of the fireman's rule involved the efficient administration of jus-
tice. 1 0 The court expressed two considerations, the first being that
since firemen are frequently injured, a limitation on liability would
prevent fires at the request of a public officer or employee, are extended workers' com-
pensation benefits by California Labor Code Sections 3365 or 3367. In the event of
injury, California Labor Code Section 4458 provides a presumption of maximum average
weekly earnings for the computation of both permanent and temporary disability com-
pensation.
103. CAL. LAuoR CODE §§4650-4663.
104. 1 A. LAESoN, LAW OF WORMAEN'S COMPENSATiON §2.40 (1972).
105. CAL. LAEOR CODE §4702.
106. STANLEY H. RurrENBERG & AssoCUA-S, INC., EcoNoMIc JusIcE: THE NnEDs
oF Fim FGHTERS 21-25 (1970).
107. 182 Cal. App. 2d 536, 6 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1960).
108. Id.. at 540-41, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
109. Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 355, 359, 72 Cal. Rptr.
119, 122 (1968) and Scott v. E.L. Yeager Constr. Co., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1190, 1195,
91 Cal. Rptr. 232, 235 (1970), quoting Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 274, 157 A.2d
129, 131 (1960).
110. 266 Cal. App. 2d at 360, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
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serve to restrict what otherwise could become an excessive burden on
the courts. 1 ' The second consideration, closely allied to the first, was
voiced as a concern that the adoption of a rule that extended liability
to firemen would lead to other "obvious expansions" of liability and
a concomitant increase in litigation." 2  Aside from the fact that the
possibility of increased litigation is not a proper basis for the refusal
to protect personal rights," 3 the Giorgi court itself pointed to several
considerations which suggest that no unmanageable burden would be
placed upon the judicial process if the fireman's rule was to be abro-
gated. The most significant of these considerations springs from the
court's observation that while "[m]ost fires of any consequence result
in injury [to some firemen], happily many of them [are] rather mi-
nor."" 4  Presumably, the great majority of these injuries would be
adequately covered by workers' compensation benefits, thereby de-
creasing the likelihood of suit by a fireman and facilitating a settlement
between the workers' compensation carrier and the defendant and/or
his liability insurance carrier. 15 In cases in which the firemen did pur-
sue an individual action against a defendant, there would still be an
incentive for settlement since the Giorgi court's concern that "[j]udi-
cial determination of the cause of a fire. . presents difficult problems
requiring lengthy trials'"' 6 is mitigated by the fact that most fires are
officially investigated as to cause.1 7  Additionally, the fireman would
not be inclined to pursue a less than substantial claim since his workers'
compensation carrier would have a right of subrogation up to the
amount of the benefits it had paid to him.1  It is submitted that these
111. Id.
112. Id. at 360, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 122-23.
113. Courts not only compromise their basic responsibility to decide the merits
of each case individually but destroy the public's confidence in them by using
the broad broom of "administrative convenience" to sweep away a class of
claims a number of which are admittedly meritorious. . . . [W]e cannot let
the difficulties of adjudication frustrate the principle that there be a remedy
for every substantial wrong.
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 737-39, 441 P.2d 912, 918-19, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 78-
79 (1965).
114. 266 Cal. App. 2d at 360, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
115. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§21450-21455; CAL. LABOR CoDE §§3850-3864.
116. 266 Cal. App. 2d at 360, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
117. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §13852(h); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §6607
(Cum. Supp. 1974); IowA CoDn ANN. §§100.1-100.3 (1972); OrIo REv. CODE ANN.
§3737.08 (Page 1971); ORE. REv. STAT. §476.210 (1973).
118. That subrogation rights may be so extensive as to effectively extinguish an em-
ployee's cause of action is well illustrated by Bilyeu v. State Employees' Retirement Sys-
tem, 58 Cal. 2d 618, 375 P. 442, 25 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1962). The plaintiff police officer's
entire recovery against the tortfeasor ($62,000) was absorbed by the state for compen-
sation and retirement benefits paid, which led Justice Peters to remark in a concurring
opinion:
As a result, plaintiff will receive no benefit at all from his tort action against
the tortfeasor. He will receive not one penny for his pain and suffering. So
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considerations, together with the difficulties normally encountered in
maintaining a successful cause of action in negligence, would preclude
an undue interference with the efficient administration of justice.
It can also be argued that abrogation of the fireman's rule would not
result in the unwarranted expansion of liability perceived by the Giorgi
court when it queried whether an ambulance driver could recover from
a person who caused the accident which necessitated the ambulance
driver's presence. 119 Abolition of the fireman's rule would simply re-
move an artificial bar to a fireman's right to recover for injuries fore-
seeably caused by another's negligence in starting a fire, whereas the
ambulance driver's ability to recover could depend on resolution of a
difficult proximate cause issue arising from the independent, interven-
ing tortious conduct of another driver. Likewise, abrogation of the
fireman's rule and restoration of a duty owed to firemen coming onto
the scene of a fire would have little bearing on the issue of whether
a patient in a hospital disease ward could be held liable to a hospital
attendant for having "negligently" exposed himself to a contagious dis-
ease.' 20 Resolution of the problem posed by the Giorgi court's second
hypothetical would be predicated upon a determination of whether a
duty exists to avoid exposure of oneself to contagious diseases. This
determination, in turn, would depend upon the foreseeability of infect-
ing others after negligent exposure of oneself to a contagious disease.
No similar foreseeability problems appear to exist regarding the situa-
tion in which negligent maintenance of property leads to a fire which
injures others. 2'
B. The Equal Protection Challenge
The effect of the Giorgi, Scott, and Bilyeu decisions is to create dif-
ferent classifications of persons who are similarly situated without af-
fording equal treatment to those classes. On the one hand are firemen
who are denied a cause of action for "negligence in the creation of the
very occasion for [their] engagement,"' 12 2 and on the other are all
other public employees who are not similarly denied the right to their
causes of action. Accordingly, it may be argued that there is a viola-
far as he is concerned, he should never have filed the tort action. In the fu-
turep, there will be no inducement for state employees in the position of plaintiff
to file such actions.
Id. at 629, 375 P.2d at 449, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
119. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
120. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
121. See text accompanying notes 68-73 supra.
122. See authorities cited note 109 supra.
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tion of the equal protection provisions of the United States"2 3 and Cali-
fornia 2 4 Constitutions. Resolution of this argument is dependent upon
the degree of scrutiny with which the justifications for the fireman's
rules are examined, which in turn is dependent upon the type of inter-
est affected by the challenged law. The fireman's rule is not based
upon a "suspect classification"' 25 such as race, 2 6 alienage, 27 or na-
tionality, 28 nor does it affect a "fundamental freedom" such as the
right to vote,' 29 the right to worship freely, 30 or the right to travel from
one state to another,'' in which case it would be subject to strict ju-
dicial scrutiny requiring a demonstration that the classification was
"necessary" to promote a "compelling state interest."'132  Since the fire-
man's rule is principally based upon economic considerations, tradi-
tional equal protection analysis would evaluate its justification under
the more lenient "rational basis" test which has been described by the
United States Supreme Court as follows: "The distinctions drawn by
a challenged statute must bear some rational relationship to a legitimate
state end and will be set aside as violative of the equal protection clause
only if based on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of that goal."' 3
Classifications created by a judicial rule are equally susceptible to an
equal protection challenge."'
Since the rational basis test requires little more than a "rhyme or
reason"' 35 for the classification, the fireman's rule would probably be
123. "[N]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
124. "All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation." CAL. CoNsT.
art. I, §11. "No ...citizen, or class of citizens, [shall] be granted privileges or im-
munities which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens." CAL. CONST.
art. I, §21.
125. See generally Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658-59 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
126. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
127. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
128. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944).
129. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Harper v. Board of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966).
130. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
131. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745 (1966); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
132. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 644 (1969); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
133. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969) (emphasis
added).
134. "The constitutional mandate to maintain equality before the law and equal laws
rests upon the judicial department of government with as much force as upon the other
departments." Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, 281 Mass. 303, 320, 184
N.E. 152 161 (1933) (citations omitted). See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958);
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Lad-
ner v. Siegel, 298 Pa. 487, 148 A. 699 (1930).
135. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948).
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upheld as constitutional for the reasons advanced by the Giorgi court;
namely, the public policy considerations of distribution of cost and
avoidance of an undue expansion of litigation.13 6  Recently, however,
it has been argued13 7 that this traditional approach toward essentially
economic classifications has given way to a more demanding equal pro-
tection analysis first articulated by the United States Supreme Court
in Reed v. Reed."8' In that case, which dealt with a statute giving
preference to a male relative when both a male and a female of the
same degree of kinship sought appointment as administrator of an in-
testate's estate, the state's justifications for the statute failed. Though
subsequent cases debate the scope of Reed's rational basis test,139 it
was used to defeat California's automobile guest statute in Brown v.
Merlo.140 Since Brown constitutes the most recent statement of Cali-
fornia's rational basis test, the fireman's rule should be evaluated in
light of this decision.
The Brown court set forth its test as follows:
.[T]he principle of "equal protection" preserved 'by both state and
federal Constitutions, of course, "does not preclude the state from
drawing any distinctions between different groups of individuals,"
but it does require that, at a minimum, "persons similarly situated
with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treat-
ment."
. .."A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and sub-
stantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.'" Thus, when a
statute provides that one class shall receive different treatment than
another, our constitutional provisions demand more "than nondis-
criminatory application within the class ... establish[ed]. [They]
also [impose] a requirement of some rationality in the nature of
the class singled out."'141
136. Cf. Tammen v. County of San Diego, 66 Cal. 2d 468, 426 P.2d 753, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 249 (1966); Dias v. Eden Township Hosp. Dist., 57 Cal. 2d 502, 370 P.2d 334,
20 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1962); Lewis v. City & County of San Francisco, 21 Cal. App. 3d
339, 98 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1971); Wadley v. County of Los Angeles, 205 Cal. App. 2d
668, 23 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1962).
137. See Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HtAv. L. RIv. 1 (1972).
138. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
139. While the Court has never delineated the Reed rationale as a third test per
se, it appears to have applied it under the mantle of the rational basis test. See, e.g.,
O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528 (1973); James v. Strange 407 U.S. 128 (1972). Compare Frontiero v. Rich-
ardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) with O'Neill v. Dent, 364 F. Supp. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
140. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
141. Id. at 861, 506 P.2d at 216, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 392 (citations omitted).
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The fireman's rule establishes two distinct classifications which are
justified in the Giorgi and Scott opinions by the public policy arguments
previously analyzed. 142  The first argument proffered involved the fair-
ness consideration, i.e. it is not fair for the fireman to complain of in-
juries sustained in the very occasion of his employment.' As seen
earlier, this is not really a reason for the rule but a conclusion of its
application.' 44 In the context of equal protection it is not a purpose,
but a result. To justify a classification on no better grounds than that
it is "fair" partakes of arbitrariness, and such a justification does not
seem to afford a rational basis for refusing to permit firemen to recover
for injuries while permitting all other public employees to do so.
The second justification advanced by Giorgi was that it would be too
burdensome to require the tortfeasor to bear the cost of firemen's in-
juries when it could be more effectively distributed over those bene-
fiting from the provision of fire fighting services.'-" This particular
justification for the rule should be examined in light of the common
law tenet reaffirmed in Brown v. Merlo which maintains that "'[w]hen
the reason of a rule ceases, so should the rule itself.' ,,14" The Row-
land decision serves as a prime example of the application of this tenet
of common law, as the court, in abolishing the trespasser-licensee-in-
vitee classification scheme as irrational in contemporary society, de-
clared that "[a] man's life or limb does not become less worthy of
protection by the law nor a loss less worthy of compensation under the
law because he has come upon the land of another without permission
or with permission but without a business purpose."' 47  This reasoning
is equally appropriate for firemen since their right to compensation for
negligently inflicted injuries is no less worthy of protection merely be-
cause of their status as firemen. A further application of the common
law tenet was made in Brown when it was held that the automobile
guest statute no longer afforded protection to the generous host, but
to his insurance company. The increased prevalence of automobile lia-
bility insurance, which effectively distributes the risk of loss over the
motoring public, underlay the court's conclusion that "[t]he policy
concept that it is unfair to shift the burden from the injured person to
his host.., is no longer applicable."' 4  This result is analogous to
142. See text accompanying notes 67-121 supra.
143. See authorities cited note 109 supra.
144. See text accompanying notes 50-57 supra.
145. 266 Cal. App. 2d 355, 360, 72 Cal. Rptr. 119, 122.
146. 8 Cal. 3d at 868, 506 P.2d at 221, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 397, quoting CAL. Crv.
CODE §3510.
147. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 118, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 105 (1968).
148. 8 Cal. 3d at 868, 506 P.2d at 221, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 397, quoting McConville
v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 383, 113 N.W.2d 14, 19 (1962).
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that of the fireman's rule wherein the burden is not shifted from the
tortfeasor to the public, as envisioned by the Giorgi court, but to the
fireman. This misallocation of the burden of compensating for fire-
men's injuries derives from the present inadequacy of statutory levels
of compensation. 149  Liability insurance would effectively place the
burden upon the public. Upon this analysis of the distribution of cost
rationale for the fireman's rule, it must be concluded that there is an
insubstantial relationship between the justification and the classifica-
tion.
A final argument offered by the Giorgi court in support of the fire-
man's rule concerned the efficient administration of justice.'50 The
previous discussion has suggested that this consideration is inadequate
justification for a rule which denies protection of substantial personal
rights.' Furthermore, the Giorgi court's concern that an unwarranted
expansion of liability would arise in the absence of a fireman's rule is
misplaced to the extent that it fails to consider the restraints imposed
on liability by the actionable negligence elements of duty and proxi-
mate cause.'5 2  The Brown decision inferentially supports the conclu-
sion that Giorgi's efficient administration of justice rationale is insuffi-
cient justification for the classification of firemen. In Brown the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court declared as irrational
a rule which, in order to prevent collusive lawsuits, broadly elimi-
nates causes of action of an entire class of individuals, some of
whom may institute collusive suits, but many of whom have en-
tirely valid causes of action. This court, indeed, over the past two
decades, has decided a series of cases which have rejected just such
a rationale.' 53
Similarly, the fireman's rule, which is intended in part to prevent an
undue expansion of liability and an increased workload on the judicial
system, broadly eliminates causes of action by all firemen although
many firemen's claims might be settled and many others which were
brought to trial might not require the lengthy trials envisioned by
Giorgi.
CONCLUSION
Although the courts have been virtually unanimous in denying a paid
fireman a cause of action against one whose negligence caused the fire
149. See text accompanying notes 101-105 supra.
150. 266 Cal. App. 2d 355, 360, 72 Cal. Rptr. 119, 122.
151. See text accompanying notes 110-118 supra.
152. See text accompanying notes 119-121 supra.
153. 8 Cal. 3d at 874, 506 P.2d at 255 106 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
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in which he was injured, the rationale has traditionally been expressed
in terms of occupier immunity or assumption of risk. Not having these
theories available,'5 the Giorgi court considered several public policy
factors which it deemed to weigh sufficiently in favor of the "fireman's
rule." While these policy considerations have obvious merit, the fore-
going discussion has raised countervailing considerations which appear
to have transcending importance. Most importantly, the fireman
should not be compelled to bear an inordinate and unnecessary burden
of loss. The compensation he presently receives from the public is
often inadequate protection against the inherent risks of his profession.
If the fireman's rule is to be maintained, consideration should be given
to providing increased financial benefits uniquely available to the fire-
man so that he is afforded protection at least equal to that of other
public employees.
The better solution, however, would appear to be to abolish the rule
and give firemen a cause of action in their own right. This would help
alleviate the burden on an already strapped public fund1 55 while con-
tributing to the public incentive to practice active fire prevention. Ad-
ditionally, the utilization of private liability insurance, which was ap-
parently not considered by the Giorgi court, would appear to be the
most equitable means of placing the burden for negligently caused fire
losses upon those most directly responsible. Granting the fireman a
cause of action in negligence would neither add unreasonably to the
burden imposed on occupier or nonoccupier defendants nor unduly in-
terfere with the efficient administration of justice. Apart from public
policy considerations which militate against the continued existence of
the fireman's rule, there appear to be sufficient grounds to argue for
abrogation of the fireman's rule on the basis of an equal protection
challenge. Of all public employees, only fireman are denied a cause
of action for injuries sustained in the course of their employment.
Under the stricter mode of judicial scrutiny of economic classifications
suggested by the Reed and Brown decisions, the justifications for the
fireman's rule promulgated by the Giorgi and Scott courts appear to
be insufficient to uphold the classification which the fireman's rule
creates.
As an alternative to abrogation of the fireman's rule, and the result-
ing unrestricted right to a cause of action in negligence by the fireman,
it should be noted that a well drawn statute could afford firemen sub-
154. See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
155. AMEmcA BuRNING, supra note 81, at 5.
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stantial protection from some of the more serious risks of the profes-
sion while simultaneously increasing the incentive for fire prevention.
Most aptly illustrative of this approach is section 205-a of the New York
General Municipal Law' 56 which provides for recovery by firemen or
their heirs of specified minimum sums of money in cases of injury or
death resulting from a fire caused by the negligence of a person in fail-
ing to comply with any applicable statute, fire rule, ordinance, or other
fire regulation. This type of statute provides a partial solution to the
inability of firemen to recover against the culpable party for injuries
sustained in the course of fighting a negligently created fire, since it
provides for recovery in situations in which a fire resulted from viola-
tion of a statute or regulation designed to promote fire safety. Since
California has numerous statutory and administrative provisions aimed
at promoting fire safety, 5 7 consideration might be given to enactment
of a statute similar to the New York General Municipal Law. Such
a statute would offer partial relief to California firemen who are pres-
ently denied full and effective compensation for their injuries by opera-
tion of the fireman's rule.
Michael W. Moss
156. In addition to any other right of action or recovery under any other pro-
vision of law, in the event any accident, causing injury, death or a disease
which results in death, occurs directly or indirectly as a result of any neglect,
omission, wilful or culpable negligence of any person or persons in failing to
comply with the requirements of any of the statutes, ordinances, rules, orders
and requirements of the federal, state, county, village, town or city govern-
ments or any and all their departments, divisions and bureaus, the person or
persons guilty of said neglect, omission, willful or culpable negligence at the
time of such injury or death shall be liable to pay any officer, member, agent
or employee of any fire department injured, or whose life may be lost while
in the discharge of performance of any duty imposed by the fire commissioner,
fire chief or other superior officer of the fire department, or pay to the wife
and children, or to pay to the parents, or to pay to the brothers and sisters,
being the surviving heirs-at-law of any deceased person thus having lost his life,
a sum of money, in case of injury to persons, not less than one thousand dol-
lars, and in case of death not less than five thousand dollars, such liability to
be determined and such sums recovered in an action to be instituted by any
person injured or the family or relatives of any person ildled as aforesaid.
N.Y. GEN. MuNIC. LAw §205-a (McKinney 1974).
157. E.g., CAL. HEHn & SAFETY CODE §13000 et seq.; SACRAMENTO COUNTY CODE
§ 17.04 el seq.
